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The concept of negligence dominates tort law. Most tort cases
are about negligence. Much tort law scholarship over the past sev-
eral decades has been about the meaning of negligence. The new
draft Restatement (Third) of Torts: General Principles ("Discussion
Draft") devotes the vast majority of its first volume to negligence.1
And the idea of negligence as a liability standard is highly attrac-
tive to both the courts and commentators.
2
All the attention that negligence receives is not surprising,
given the unattractiveness of the alternatives. Imposing liability
only when the injurer intended harm seems unduly limited, in that
it absolves injurers of responsibility for harm caused by less
blameworthy, but still wrongful conduct. Yet, under many circum-
stances, strict liability seems unduly broad, in that it risks impos-
ing liability on innocent parties and depressing the level of desir-
able activities. Consequently, some form of negligence standard
(however defined in particular) seems either to get it about right, or
in any event to be a suitable compromise between the twin ex-
tremes of too little and too much liability.
The negligence standard is so much a focus of tort theory,
however, and negligence cases occupy so large a proportion of all
tort claims, that it is too easy to ignore how unusual negligence
truly is among tort law's standards of conduct. Despite the exten-
sive efforts of legal scholars to define negligence and to explore the
relation between negligence and other standards of conduct, the
character of negligence liability remains incompletely recognized.
In my view, close examination of the negligence standard reveals
that it is more troubled than its apparently central place in tort law
implies. Far from being an appropriate default rule to be used when
we are unsatisfied with the alternatives, the negligence standard is
often flawed even in the ordinary cases involving liability for physi-
cal damage that are at its core. These same flaws render negligence
an even less appropriate standard in most cases involving intangi-
1. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES (Discussion Draft Apr. 5,
1999).
2. Perhaps the most notable example of this attraction is the recognition and reconcoptu-
alization of products liability for design defects and failure to warn as based in negligence rather
than strict liability. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 & cmt. a (1998).
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ble loss, where at least until now it has been employed only in ex-
ceptional cases.
To pursue these points, I begin by examining the negligence
standard as it is applied in cases involving physical harm. Twenty-
five years ago, James Henderson, arguing in a powerful article that
the courts were applying the negligence standard in a manner that
constituted a "retreat from the rule of law,"3 began to uncover the
distinctive character of negligence in such cases. Henderson relied
heavily on the distinction between rules that are "polycentric," or
open-endedly dependent on a variety of incommensurable factors,
and those that are formal.4 I shall employ a distinction that looks at
this problem in a somewhat different light. The cases readily di-
vide, I think, into two categories: those in which the finder of fact
must in effect create a norm in order to determine whether the de-
fendant was negligent, and those governed by a pre-existing, inde-
pendent norm. I contend that negligence is a far less satisfactory
standard of conduct in the former set of cases than in the latter,
precisely because of the problems associated with norm creation.5
Turning then to cases involving intangible loss, I argue that
several of the well-known exceptions to the general rule that there
is no liability in negligence for intangible loss reflect this principle
of demarcation. In the exceptional cases in which there is negli-
gence liability for "pure" intangible loss, there is often a pre-
existing, independent norm that serves as the reference point for
the negligence determination. And there is rarely liability in negli-
gence for intangible loss in the absence of a pre-existing, independ-
ent norm that defines the applicable standard of conduct. In light of
this principle, I conclude that there should be a restrained-and
certainly not expanding-future for the negligence standard, whose
flaws even in physical injury cases should be more clearly recog-
nized, and whose application to new claims for pure intangible loss
should be resisted.
3. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat from the Rule
of Law, 51 IND. L. J. 467 (1976).
4. Id. at 475-77.
5. By a "norm" I mean an informal social requirement that has some obligatory character
to it. Of course, when juries decide negligence cases they apply norms formally, though implic-
itly, rather than informally. There is an increasing literature on the relation between "norms"
and law, whose findings I do not wish in this Paper either to buy into or out oc See, e.g., Confer-
ence, Social Norms, Social Meaning, and the Economic Analysis of Law, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 537
(1998); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L.




I. THE NORMATIVITY PROBLEM IN PHYSICAL INJURY CASES
A general standard of reasonable-care-under-the-circum-
stances defines negligence. But the level and nature of care that are
reasonable in a given situation are not self-evident. In each case,
the content of the norm of reasonable care must come from some-
where. The source of this content varies, depending on the case. In
what I call "unbounded" cases, the source is the finder of fact's own
general normative sense of the situation, informed by individual
experience and by the evidence submitted by the parties. In con-
trast, in "bounded" cases, the source of this content is a pre-
existing, concrete norm that exists independently of the finder of
fact's individual sense of the situation. The distinction between
these two types of cases is submerged in references to the negli-
gence decision as a "mixed" question of fact and law. 6 The differ-
ences between these categories are worth teasing out, for they re-
veal that unbounded negligence cases are in important respects
more problematic than cases governed by a bounded standard of
care.
A. Mixed Questions of Fact and Law in Unbounded Negligence
Cases
It is commonplace to say that in tort cases the function of the
decision-maker-the finder of fact-is to find the facts and then to
apply the law to these facts. When the finder of fact is a jury, as it
usually is, the court instructs the jury on the law and the jury then
applies it. This description entails only two moves: fact-finding and
law applying. The description is perfectly suitable when all the
facts that the jury must find are empirical-that is, when the facts
are out in the world, so to speak. In a battery case, for example, the
jury may have to decide whether the defendant intended to punch
the plaintiff in the nose, and then apply the law of battery to this
fact.
When all the "facts" are not empirical, however, the task of
the finder of fact involves three steps, not just two. In logical order,
the finder of fact must (1) find the empirical facts, including what
6. The terminology has venerable roots. See, e.g., OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE
COMMON LAW 97; (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1967); Francis H. Bohlen, Mixed Questions of Law
and Fact, 72 U. PA. L. REV. 111 (1924); James B. Thayer, "Law and Fact" in Jury Trials, 4 HARV.
L. REV. 147, 169 (1890).
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the defendant did; (2) determine how much and what kind of care
was reasonable given these facts; and (3) apply the law of negli-
gence to these findings, by deciding whether the defendant behaved
in accordance with the norm identified in step (2). It has long been
recognized that step (2) involves a very different function than step
(1), because the former is entirely empirical, whereas the latter is
evaluative. In recognition of this difference, steps (2) and (3) to-
gether have been referred to as deciding a "mixed question of fact
and law."
Useful as this terminology is for distinguishing the empirical
function of the finder of fact from the evaluative function, it con-
flates two very different forms of evaluation. In unbounded cases,
the finder of fact performs the evaluative function in essentially
unconstrained fashion. To describe this process as a mixture of fact-
finding and law-applying is misleading, for in an important sense it
involves a process that is neither. In cases where the finder of fact
is constrained or bound by an independent norm, the evaluative
function has already been performed by another agency or institu-
tion; in such cases the finder of fact does not (or at least is not sup-
posed to) engage in evaluation at all.
1. The Negligence Decision as Norm Creation
The negligence decision in an unbounded tort case is neither
a finding of empirical fact nor an application of law, and it is not
really a mixture of the two either. Rather, the negligence decision is
more typically an act of discretionary norm creation by the finder of
fact. No matter how negligence is defined in instructions to the
jury,7 or in the law applied by a judge in a bench trial, the negli-
gence standard is abstract and general. Within wide bounds, the
finder of fact does not identify a pre-existing norm, but simultane-
ously determines for itself what would constitute reasonable be-
havior under the circumstances and then applies this norm to the
situation at hand.
This phenomenon occurs both in unique cases whose facts
will never repeat themselves and in cases whose facts recur but are
not governed by "per se" rules. Many contemporary torts teachers
and scholars recognize the phenomenon in connection with recur-
ring cases. The casebooks all address the problem, making obliga-
7. For analysis of the nature of these definitions in jury instructions, see generally Stephen
G. Giles, The Invisible Hand Formula, 80 VA. L REv. 1015 (1994).
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tory reference to Holmes's famous proposal that per se rules be de-
veloped to deal with recurring cases.8 But then the rejection of
Holmes' proposal is explained on the ground that even recurring
cases differ sufficiently in their details that development of per se
rules to govern them has proved infeasible. In effect, the explana-
tion typically goes, virtually all cases are unique and must be de-
cided by the finder of fact.
This characterization of most negligence cases as unique
tends to camouflage the norm-creation phenomenon. If each case is
unique, we have no opportunity to see that it would be decided dif-
ferently by a different finder of fact. Probably in part for this rea-
son, the phenomenon is only dimly identified and infrequently dis-
cussed in the negligence literature of the last few decades.9 Never-
theless, the norm-creation feature of negligence is unlike virtually
any other prominent feature of tort law. Of course, it has long been
understood that whether to employ general "standards" or specific
"rules" poses a classic choice for lawmakers. 10 But negligence is the
paradigm example of a general standard, not a merely random ex-
ample; in any event, in contrast to negligence, many other legal
"standards" are applied as a matter of law rather than by finders of
fact."'
I understand that my characterization of this process of deci-
sion in ordinary negligence cases as norm "creation" will be contro-
versial. But if it is recognized that this process is not accurately
8. See HOLMES, supra note 6, at 98 ("But supposing a state of facts often repeated in prac.
tice, is it to be imagined that the court is to go on leaving the standard to the jury forever?").
9. Recent exceptions include Mark P. Gergen, The Jurys Role in Deciding Normative Is-
sues in the American Common Law, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 407, 424-39 (1999), and Catharine
Pierce Wells, Tort Law as Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic Justification for Jury Adjudication, 88
MICH. L. REV. 2348, 2386-90 (1990). In earlier generations the issue was more commonly dis-
cussed, though often merely in passing or in brief praise, rather than as a subject of extensive
analysis. See, e.g., LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 67 (1930) (The very purpose of a jury trial in
negligence cases "is to give a new deal in each case"); Bohlen, supra note 6, at 113 (arguing the
most the law can do is to give "general directions for the construction of the standard to be ap.
plied to each specific case"). A brief but admirably analytical treatment can be found in ROBERT
E. KEETON, VENTURING TO DO JUSTICE: REFORMING PRIVATE LAV 69 (1969).
10. See, e.g., Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemak.
ing, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974).
11. Elements of a few torts that are far less prominent than negligence occasionally also call
for the jury to exercise normative discretion by applying standards rather than rules. These
include, for example, in battery, whether a non-harmful touching was nonetheless "offensive;" in
intentional infliction of emotional distress, whether an infliction was "highly offensive;" and in
fraud, whether a plaintiffs reliance was "justifiable." Even these concepts probably involve reli-
ance on the notion of reasonable behavior as a reference point. Arguably the finder of fact some-
times also exercises normative discretion, though often only in a secondary role, in contract cases
involving issues of "good faith." See generally Gergen, supra note 9, at 451-61.
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characterized as norm "finding" or norm "identification," then the
term norm "creation" seems apt, despite the fact that the norm that
is created applies uniquely and only in the case at hand. Consider
even the simplest of negligence cases. Suppose that a homeowner
shovels off the steps leading to her front door after a snowstorm,
but does not succeed in removing all remnants of the snow. As a
result of foot traffic and inevitable daytime melting and nighttime
freezing, these remnants turn to ice. Plaintiff (an invitee) slips on
the steps, suffers bodily injury, and brings a negligence action
against the homeowner.
In this case the finder of fact must decide, among other
things, whether the homeowner exercised reasonable care to make
her property safe for the plaintiff. Undoubtedly such matters as
how much of the snow the defendant initially removed, whether she
inspected the condition of the steps on subsequent days, how visible
the ice was, how many steps there were and how steep they were,
whether there was a railing, how many hours each day the steps
could be expected to be in direct sunlight, and the snow removal
practices of others in the neighborhood, would all be relevant and
admissible.
Without question, each of these items of evidence is a poten-
tial predicate for the application of a norm to the facts of the case-
for example, that a homeowner should remove all but the tiniest
bits of snow from steps, that subsequent inspection is (or is not)
necessary, or that greater care should be exercised if the steps are
not in strong sunlight for several hours each day. But unless one or
more of these precautions is mandated by statute or ordinance (my
own definition would take these statutory cases out of the category
of unbounded cases), the failure of the defendant to employ the pre-
caution is simply an optional basis for the negligence decision by
the finder of fact. In ordinary, unbounded cases such as this, the
finder of fact is simply directed to weigh all the evidence in deciding
whether the defendant was or was not negligent.'2
Admittedly, whatever norm the finder of fact decides to ap-
ply is not created out of whole cloth; there is likely to be some basis
for it in the practices and expectations of typical homeowners and
12. Indeed, many of the standard cases repeatedly found in the leading torts casebooks pre-
sent precisely this profile. See, e.g., Pokora v. Wabash Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 98 (1931) (reasonable-
ness of failure to stop, look, and listen); United States v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir.
1947) (reasonableness of failing to keep personnel on barge that was in tow); Brown v. Kendall,
60 Mass. 292 (1850) (reasonableness of manner of separating fighting dogs); Eckert v. Long Is-
land 1R1R, 43 N.Y. 502 (1871) (reasonableness of rescue attempt); Osborne v. Montgomery, 234
N.W. 372 (Wis. 1931) (reasonableness of opening a car door under the circumstances).
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their invitees. But the decision whether the defendant negligently
maintained her steps in the case at hand does not involve identify-
ing an already applicable norm that resolves this question. Rather,
the negligence decision is precisely and entirely the selection of a
decisive norm or norms from among a variety of possibilities. In my
view, this is an act of norm creation, in the same sense that the en-
actment of a statute requiring that motor vehicles be equipped with
air bags is an act of norm creation. What is true of the simple slip-
and-fall case is even truer of factually more complex but still un-
bounded cases, such as those involving alleged design defects in
products or misuse of dangerous chemicals. When there is no "law,"
no specific pre-existing norm, that can be identified and applied,
then the finder of fact must create a norm to fit the situation. 13
This kind of unbounded norm-creation rarely occurs in areas
of tort law governed by other standards of care. For example, the
law governing battery and false imprisonment specifies the gov-
erning standard: intent. In actions for fraud, and in certain defama-
tion cases affected by constitutional concerns, the requisite state of
mind is knowledge of falsity or reckless indifference to truth or fal-
sity. In common law defamation cases, liability often depends only
on the defamatory character of the statement at issue and on its
falsity. Other causes of action follow this same pattern: liability
usually hinges on the defendant's state of mind, on actual empirical
facts, or on both. When this is not the case, and something like si-
multaneous norm creation-and-application occurs (as in strict li-
ability for abnormally dangerous activities), this process is under-
stood to be law-making. For this reason, the norm-creation decision
is a question for the court, and the decision is subject to review as a
question of law. 14
It is true that questions involving states of mind in battery,
fraud, and defamation cases are factually difficult and sometimes
vague at their border; and it is also true that finders of fact can
therefore pour their own content into a vague definition, or directly
13. This is true whether negligence is understood in ordinary parlance as reasonable be-
havior, or in cost-benefit terms under the Learned Hand calculus. In either situation, the findor
of fact must invoke values that are by no means uniformly accepted in order to make the negli-
gence determination. Moreover, whether this norm-creation takes place only under the rubric of
negligence, or also in "foreseeability" determinations under the rubric of proximate cause, the
norm creation in which the finder of fact engages is essentially the same. For discussion of tho
sense in which negligence and proximate determinations by the finder of fact overlap, Seo
KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW: AN ANALYTICAL PRIMER ON
CASES AND CONCEPTS 118-19 (1997).
14. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §520 cmt. 1.
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nullify the law in virtually any case, thus engaging in norm crea-
tion. When nullification occurs, a norm that is not legally approved
may actually be applied. But this occurs, when it does occur, out of
view and without legal permission. Only in negligence is there open
and permissible norm-creation by the finder of fact.
2. The Conscience-of-the-Community Justification
A natural response to my characterization might be to argue
that, even when there is no concrete, discrete norm for the finder of
fact to apply, such a norm typically is inchoate in common experi-
ence and values. Negligence decisions, it might be thought, discover
such norms rather than create them. This is in essence the notion
that the finder of fact represents and reflects the conscience of the
community, simply serving as the vehicle through which norms im-
plicit in everyday behavior are identified and applied.",
Although I cannot definitively disprove this notion, I contend
that at the level of fine detail that is at stake in ordinary un-
bounded negligence cases, there is usually no single conscience of
the community. The values of contemporary society are too diverse
for that.16 We have too many different ways of behaving, and too
many different conceptions of how people ought to behave, to expect
widespread agreement about which individual behaviors count as
reasonable and which as negligent. In factually more complex but
still unbounded cases-for example, products liability cases in-
volving design defects or the failure to warn-it is even less likely
that there is any kind of single community conscience about how
safe a particular product design should be, or how much detail
should be included in a warning about the side effects of a prescrip-
tion drug.
17
Moreover, I doubt that there ever was a single, identifiable
conscience of the community in this sense, even in earlier periods
when there was more cultural homogeneity than at present. Take
even the simplest of ordinary negligence cases involving an activity
15. See Leon Green, Jury Trial and Mr. Justice Black, 65 YALE LJ. 482, 483 (1956); Greg-
ory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 STAN. L, REV. 311, 380-
81 (1996); Patrick J. Kelley, Who Decides? Community Safety Concentions at the Heart of Tort
Liability, 38 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 315, 380 (1990); Wells, supra note 9, at 2408-10.
16. See NEAL FEIGENSON, LEGAL BLAME: HOW JURORS THINK AND TALK ABOUT ACCim DS
11 (2000) (arguing peoples' judgments about fault are shaped by their life experiences, attitudes,
habits of mind, and intuitions about how the world works).
17. See Henderson, supra note 3, at 490 (criticizing courts for permitting determinations in
design defect cases to be based on test of reasonableness under all the circumstances).
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with which the finder of fact can be assumed to be wholly familiar.
The accepted view of such cases is that the finder of fact, being na-
tive to the activity, so to speak, needs little or no educating in order
to determine whether the defendant behaved negligently, but can
simply invoke its own conscience and thereby serve as an accurate
representative of the community. The classic case is Vaughan v.
Menlove, 18 in which jurors were asked to determine whether one of
their neighbors negligently constructed a haystack (or "rick"). The
modern analog is of course the slip-and-fall or motor vehicle acci-
dent. In both cases, the finder of fact is presumably so acquainted
with and inclined to automatically apply the community norm that
the case could go to the jury almost without any instruction beyond
asking whether the defendant "did the right thing."
In Vaughan the defendant's hayrick caught fire, apparently
through spontaneous combustion, and the fire spread to the plain-
tiffs property. The principal issue was whether an aperture should
or should not have been built in the stack. One would think that if
there were such a thing as a community norm regarding haystack
construction, it would encompass whether and when to build aper-
tures. But right at this seminal moment in the development of neg-
ligence law, the report of the decision in Vaughan-apparently re-
counting the evidence-makes a deeply revealing statement. The
defendant ". . . made an aperture or chimney through the rick; but
in spite, or perhaps in consequence of this precaution, the rick at
length burst into flames from the spontaneous heating of its mate-
rials."'19 Just as in my hypothetical slip-and-fall case, the commu-
nity norm in Vaughan, if there was one, did not come all the way
down to the ground. The conscience of the community in Vaughan
apparently was divided about apertures.
In short, the notion that the finder of fact can identify,
rather than create, a norm applicable to injuries involving everyday
activities is problematic. Often we do not have norms capable of
self-application even to everyday activities. I have argued that what
finders of fact must therefore do in unbounded negligence cases is
norm "creation." Others would insist that this is what we under-
stand to be norm "application." Whatever name is given to the proc-
ess, it is a lot more like discretionary law-making than the tradi-
tional reference to the finder of fact's decision of "mixed questions"
of law and fact implies. Just as importantly, as I argue next, be-
18. Vaughan v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (1837).
19. Id. at 491 (emphasis added).
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cause this law-making is conducted under the guise of deciding a
question of fact, it is likely not to be done the same way by different
juries, and is not subject to meaningful review.
3. The Significance of Case-by-Case Decision
Given this norm creation in unbounded cases, instead of
having a law of negligence that applies in such cases, we merely
have (as Leon Green put it long ago) a process for deciding negli-
gence cases. 20 The key to that process is not simply that it involves
simultaneous norm creation-and-application, though that is an im-
portant feature. What makes the process go is the fact that each
such act is freestanding. That is, for purposes of review (realisti-
cally, of non-review) by a court, the decision of a so-called "mixed"
question of law and fact is treated the same way as a "pure" ques-
tion of fact. The question is left to the finder of fact so long as rea-
sonable people could disagree about its resolution. A decision for or
against negligence is equally acceptable.
This is true in both factually unique and recurring cases. If,
hypothetically, four juries were impaneled to hear the same unique
case brought by four plaintiffs injured in the same accident by a
single defendant, a decision by two juries that the defendant was
negligent and by two juries that it was not negligent would have to
be acceptable. Similarly, in cases whose facts recur, the finder of
fact in a subsequent case, addressing precisely the same relevant
facts as in a prior case, may decide the "mixed" question of whether
the defendant was negligent differently from the prior finder of fact.
In this respect, the relation between the finder of fact in a
negligence case and the courts-trial and appellate-parallels the
relation between the modern administrative agency and the courts.
In pursuing their rulemaking function, administrative agencies
create norms, subject to judicial reversal only if their decisions are
arbitrary, capricious, or not in accord with law. The finder of fact in
a negligence case also engages in rulemaking that is subject only to
deferential judicial review. But unlike administrative rulemaking,
in negligence cases, a new rule is made again for each case, and the
rule may differ from case to case even when the facts do not.
2'
20. GREEN, supra note 9, at 185. For discussion of Green's relation to the realist movement
and the significance of his scholarship, see G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA 75-83
(1980).
21. After developing this analogy myself, I found to my chagrin that Bohlen had beaten me
to the punch seventy-five years ago. Bohlen, supra note 6, at 115.
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Observing this process in its early stages of development,
Holmes argued that over time, trial judges would be able to discern
the existence of governing community norms or, in the event that a
consistent norm did not emerge, impose one as a matter of law in
commonly recurring fact situations.22 As every first-year law stu-
dent learns, however, neither occurs. The world of accidents is too
diverse to have permitted the emergence of a series of independent,
pre-existing norms concrete enough to decide individual cases. As I
put it earlier, most negligence cases are "unique" in this sense. The
judiciary has declined Holmes's invitation to take the case-by-case
norm-creation function away from the finder of fact by creating
rigid per se rules that would apply notwithstanding the factual di-
versity of most negligence cases.
It would be wrong to conclude, however, that my quarrel
here is with the institution of civil trial by jury. Though the use of
juries as finders of fact exacerbates the problem I have identified, it
does not cause it. Even if we had no juries in negligence cases,
treating the negligence decision in each case as a question of fact
would lead to the same phenomenon. The results in unique cases
would still depend heavily on which judge heard the cases. And re-
curring cases still would not necessarily be decided alike. The same
trial judge deciding a later case involving the same relevant facts as
an earlier case would not necessarily decide it in the same way; and
different trial judges deciding cases involving the same relevant
facts also certainly would not necessarily decide them the same
way. Each judge, in each instance, would be engaging in an act of
norm-creation.
Nonetheless, I doubt that the process of norm creation,
which I submit is at the core of unbounded negligence cases, could
have survived if we did not have juries.23 We would not long have
tolerated having individual judges assess the quality of everyday
conduct in order to decide whether to impose civil liability for the
consequences of that conduct. The increasing tendency of trial
judges, as the twentieth century proceeded, to submit issues for
jury decision rather than to decide them as a matter of law is a tes-
22. HOLMES, supra note 6, at 98-99.
23. The very distinction between questions of fact and questions of law reflects the long-
standing struggle within tort law over the respective roles of judge and jury-a struggle with
political as much as doctrinal implications. Had this struggle not persisted during the formative
era of negligence law, not only the norm-creation in which juries engage, but many of the other
doctrines and practices that characterize tort cases-presumptions, per se rules, directed ver.
dicts-might well have developed very differently. See generally GREEN, supra note 9 (discussing
the development of restrictions on jury discretion); Thayer, supra note 6 (same).
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tament to the growing influence of the democratic ethos as negli-
gence law has developed. Nor could trial judges have easily avoided
revealing that norm creation was at the heart of the negligence de-
cision. Judges typically must make explicit findings of fact and con-
clusions of law; the basis for their decisions is reflected in these
findings and conclusions. In contrast, juries do not need to explain
their decisions, and rarely do. Their norm creation has long been
masked by the "featureless generality" of the jury verdict.24 In
short, although the civil jury is not the cause of norm creation, the
continued existence of the civil jury probably is necessary to it.
B. Bounded Cases: Independent, Pre-Existing Norms
There is a second class of cases in which several of the sub-
sidiary doctrines of the law of negligence are in fact directed at
eliminating, or at least ameliorating, the norm-creation phenome-
non. These are cases in which the familiar rules governing custom,
statutes, and professional standards figure prominently. One view
of these rules is that they are designed to address the problem of
jury unfamiliarity with the technically complex activities that often
generate modern negligence cases. The way in which these doc-
trines achieve this goal, however, is by identifying pre-existing, in-
dependent norms whose use by the finder of fact tends to render the
negligence decision an act of norm application rather than norm
creation.
1. Custom
A custom is little more than the law's term for a norm. The
hornbook rule is that evidence of compliance with, or violation of, a
customary way of doing things is admissible but not dispositive on
the issue of the actor's negligence. 25 This is more than just a rule of
evidence, however, precisely because of the way in which designat-
ing a practice as "custom" tends to cut down the degree of rule-
making discretion exercised by the finder of fact.
In fact, consider how little evidentiary admissibility turns on
whether a practice qualifies as a custom. Suppose that some tug-
boats carry global positioning system ("GPS") equipment and some
do not. As a consequence, some tugs can more precisely navigate
24. HOLMES, supra note 6, at 89.
25. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LXV OF TORTS 193 (1984).
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than others. Even though the practice is not uniformly followed and
therefore does not qualify as a custom, evidence of a particular tug-
boat-defendant's failure to carry GPS equipment would be admissi-
ble on behalf of the plaintiff in a case involving allegedly negligent
navigation. Carrying GPS equipment is an untaken precaution
whose availability the plaintiff is entitled to have the jury consider
in assessing the defendant's negligence. Conversely, if a particular
tugboat-defendant did carry GPS equipment, the defendant would
be entitled to have the jury assessing its negligence consider the
fact that this precaution was taken, even if the precaution was not
customary.
So the evidence in question is admissible regardless of
whether it goes to a practice having the status of custom, or simply
to a precaution that only some actors would have taken. 26 Conse-
quently, either the law has been mistaken all these years in sup-
posing that anything turns on whether a practice is designated as a
custom, or something more than mere evidentiary admissibility
turns on the designation.
In fact, something more than admissibility does turn on the
designation. The court's instructions to the jury are likely to make
reference to the rule regarding custom. 27 For this reason the par-
ties are entitled to make reference to what is customary in anticipa-
tion of such an instruction. An instruction highlighting the signifi-
cance of custom, even while expressly giving the jury discretion to
disregard it, will focus the jury's attention on the normal way of
doing things. Evidence of a practice followed by some but not all
actors is likely to be less persuasive than evidence of a custom fol-
lowed by all or most actors.
Customs also have a second important characteristic. Not
only are customs norms that are ordinarily followed by most actors
engaged in the activity at issue, they have the additional signifi-
cance-at least where the fact that a practice is a custom has any
operational significance-of being concrete and specific enough to
govern individual cases. If it is a custom for tugboats to carry GPS
equipment, then the finder of fact need only "apply" this customary
norm to the facts in order to determine whether a tugboat was neg-
ligent. This specificity is precisely what is lacking in the general
norm of reasonable care, and precisely what necessitates norm
26. See, e.g., The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 739-40 (2d Cir. 1932) (Although carrying radios
was not a custom among New York tug boats, evidence of failure to carry a radio was admitted.).
27. E.g., 1 CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL §3.16 (7th ed. 1986); 4 MINNESOTA
PRACTICE: JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES § 101.1 (3d. ed. 1986) (amended as §26.15 (4th ed.)).
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creation in unbounded cases. It is true that, as Learned Hand
memorably said, "there are precautions so imperative that even
their universal disregard will not excuse their omission."'' But or-
dinarily the normative force of custom is likely to result in its ap-
plication to the case at hand, rather than in the creation of an al-
ternative norm.
2. Professional Standards and Statutes
Two other negligence-defining doctrines go even further, by
more clearly removing the norm-creation function from the finder of
fact. In most jurisdictions the unexcused violation of a statute is
negligence per se. 29 In many jurisdictions, the compliance of a pro-
fessional with the standard of care followed by at least a respect-
able minority within the profession is not malpractice. 30 In these
instances discretion to create a norm is removed from the finder of
fact because the legislature or a profession has already done that
work. In cases such as these, the negligence decision involves the
application of an independent, pre-existing norm to the empirical
facts, rather than the creation of a norm. It may be that the act of
applying the norm to the empirical facts involves the exercise of
very low-level discretion-it is not alvays plain, for example,
whether the minority of professionals subscribing to the standard
followed by the defendant in a malpractice case qualifies as a "re-
spectable" minority. But permitting the exercise of discretion in this
fashion is a far cry from asking the finder of fact to determine
whether, all things considered, the defendant practiced medicine in
reasonable fashion.
The role that statutes and professional standards play in
negligence cases is thus very similar to the role played by custom.
In each instance, the finder of fact is encouraged or required to ap-
ply an independent norm that has developed through either experi-
ence (custom and professional standards) or legal authority (stat-
utes). In contrast to the unbounded case in which the finder of fact
has no independent norm to employ in adjudicating between the
contentions of the parties regarding the reasonableness of particu-
lar precautions, in cases governed by these doctrines, external
authority, professional expertise, or nearly uniform experience has
already made this reasonableness determination.
28. The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d at 740.
29. E.g., Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 814 (N.Y. 1920).
30. E.g., Sinclair v. Block, 633 A.2d 1137, 1142 (Pa. 1993).
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Moreover, this difference between unbounded and bounded
negligence cases does not disappear whenever there is a factual
dispute about the applicable custom, statute, or professional stan-
dard. In cases where there is a "battle of experts" or other form of
factual dispute as to the applicable independent norm, the function
of the finder of fact is still empirical rather than normative. That is,
the question is which custom, statute, or professional standard is
applicable (or how it is applicable), not which of these norms the
finder of fact prefers. No doubt the outcomes of cases in which the
applicable independent norm is disputed are less predictable than
cases in which there is no such dispute. But that is true of any case
in which disputed facts are messy or complicated. Such cases are
still bounded, in contrast to those in which no independent norm is
even theoretically applicable.
C. The Deficiencies of Norm Creation
My focus thus far has been to identify and develop the dis-
tinction between negligence cases in which the finder of fact en-
gages in norm-creation and cases governed by a pre-existing, inde-
pendent norm. I now turn from description to evaluation. There are
two major deficiencies inherent in negligence cases not governed by
an independent, pre-existing norm that pours content into the neg-
ligence standard: greater unpredictability of result and less legiti-
macy.
1. Unpredictability of Result
A major advantage of negligence cases governed by inde-
pendent norms is that there is likely to be much greater predict-
ability of result in cases governed by such norms than in un-
bounded cases, in which the finder of fact engages in norm creation.
When an independent, pre-existing norm governs, that norm is
wholly or partially outcome-determinative. When no such norm
governs, however, different finders of fact are much more likely to
arrive at different conclusions as to the reasonableness of the same
conduct. Greater variability of result means greater unpredictabil-
ity of result.
31
31. Concern with unpredictability of result has affected not only the structuring of fact-
finding with which I am concerned here, but also law-making more generally. For example, my
colleague G. Edward White has ascribed the founding of the American Law Institute and the
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Unpredictability of result has two main negative conse-
quences. First, when actors are unable to predict how their behav-
ior will be judged if that behavior causes harm, the deterrent effect
of the threat of liability is sub-optimal.32 Second, once harm has oc-
curred and a negligence action has been instituted, settlement is
likely to be impeded because of the greater likelihood that the par-
ties' predictions of the result will diverge.
33
Both deterrence and the promotion of settlement are instru-
mental values. Other things being equal, rules and practices that
further these values are desirable. But when other considerations
are in tension with these values, some sacrifice of deterrence or in
the promotion of settlement may be worthwhile. In the following
section, I discuss a cluster of such non-instrumental considerations.
2. The Legitimacy Question
If I am correct that finders of fact in unbounded negligence
cases engage in norm creation, then in a meaningful sense, the pro-
cess of decision-making in such cases is the process of making law.34
The norm that the finder of fact creates is a standard of behavior, a
legal rule governing the specific case at hand. It is true that this
rule lacks one important feature of law-generality of application.
The rule applies only to the case at hand. But it has two other im-
portant characteristics of law: it is normative and authoritative.
The second dimension along which the negligence standard
should be evaluated, therefore, is the legitimacy of law-making de-
resulting restatement movement in part to the desire during the nineteen-twenties to reduce
jurisprudential "uncertainty" and "complexity." G. Edward White, The American Law Institute
and the Triumph of Modernist Jurisprudence, 15 LAW & HIST. REV. 1, 2 (1997).
32. Whether there is over- or underdeterrence depends on the interaction of a number of
factors. See generally John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Coin-
pliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REv. 965 (1984) (discussing the relation between deter-
rence and the precision of legal rules).
33. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGALSTUD. 1, 10-11 (1984).
34. This was certainly the view of Chief Justice Traynor of the Supreme Court of California.
See, e.g., Mosley v. Arden Farms Co., 157 P.2d 372, 377 (Cal. 1945) ('The determination of the
standard of reasonable conduct by which a defendant's conduct is to be measured involves a
question of law, a determination whether or not liability should be imposed. This question is
nevertheless commonly left to the jury.") (Traynor, J., concurring); Toschi v. Christian, 149 P.2d
848, 854 (Cal. 1944) ("It is a question of law what the rule or standard of conduct should be for
adjudging the actions of men as lawful or unlawful and for determining the consequences of
those actions.") (Traynor, J., dissenting in part and concurring in judgment). These passages are
quoted in Stephen A. Weiner, The Civil Jury Trial and the Law-Fact Distinction, 54 CAL. L REV.
1867, 1879 & n.57 (1966).
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cisions made pursuant to this standard. In one sense of the term,
legitimacy is a formal characteristic of political institutions to
which the polity has given necessary consent. Negligence decisions
are certainly legitimate in this formal sense, given that they take
place in accordance with duly adopted sources of law, such as the
Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution and its
equivalents at the state level. I shall use the notion of legitimacy in
an additional, substantive sense, however, to refer as well to the
political and moral acceptability of employing negligence as a stan-
dard of liability in civil trials.
a. Unbounded Cases
The legitimacy of decision in unbounded negligence cases
must rest heavily on the impartiality and good faith of the finder of
fact. Jurors have nothing personally at stake in the outcome of
negligence cases and therefore nothing at stake in their choice of a
norm to govern outcomes. And because jurors are chosen at large
from the community, there is no reason a priori to suppose that the
pool of jurors has any systematic bias that would distinguish it
from the body politic as a whole. The composition of jury pools may
vary across jurisdictions and therefore result in actual biases, but
this is essentially a matter of implementation rather than principle.
In contrast, when trial judges serve as finders of fact, as occurs in a
minority of cases, the risk of systematic bias is greater because of
the political character of judicial appointment and election. But
judges who serve as finders of fact in bench trials also bring juridi-
cal impartiality and good faith to negligence cases, even if they
bring a political viewpoint as well.
The legitimacy of decision by finders of fact in unbounded
negligence cases, however, is undermined by two factors related to
the potential variability of result across decision-makers, whether
the facts of the case are unique or recurring. First, as has long been
observed, the negligence system is like a lottery.3 5 Outcomes appear
to be no more than the result of the flip of a coin. This analogy is
overdrawn because a deliberative process rather than mere chance
actually determines outcomes. 36 But since the values brought to
35. See, e.g., Marc A. Franklin, Replacing the Negligence Lottery: Compensation and Selec-
tive Reimbursement, 53 VA. L. REV. 774 (1967) (arguing that the outcomes of negligence cases aro
uncertain).
36. For the argument that this process of deliberation generates "local objectivity"' in jury
decisions, see Wells, supra note 9, at 2408-10.
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these deliberations by finders of fact is much like the flip of a coin
by the parties, the process lacks the ingredients of uniformity and
regularity that would be necessary to engender greater legitimacy.
Thus, the negligence determination in unique cases is heav-
ily dependent on the particular finder of fact making that decision.
And recurring cases, which are alike in relevant respects, may be
decided differently by different finders of fact.3 7 Basing decisions on
law rather than on the values of the decision-maker as well as de-
ciding like cases alike, however, are highly desirable at the very
least, and arguably necessary as a matter of deep principle when-
ever feasible. 38 The prospect that the process as a whole may result
in these two related forms of inequity therefore undermines its
overall legitimacy.
Second, the factor that undermines the legitimacy of the pro-
cess-the absence of a single, homogeneous community conscience
as to what constitutes reasonable care in any particular instance-
renders the decision in any given case politically and morally prob-
lematic. Suppose that we had a rule that negligence cases would
always be decided by the defendant's next-door neighbor. Even set-
ting aside the possibility of bias, most people would object to being
judged in a negligence case by a single individual, on the ground
that this individual's conception of reasonable behavior is a mere
contingency-no better than one's own conception, and possibly
worse.39
The use of multi-person finders of fact who are required to
engage in a deliberative process of decision may mitigate this objec-
tion, but it does not dissolve it. A negligence decision that reflects
only the distinctive point of view of the particular individuals who
37. Unfortunately, experimental and survey studies on consistency of decision.making by
different juries cannot shed much light on this issue, because (understandably) the studies do not
distinguish between bounded and unbounded cases. See, e.g., Edith Greene et al., The Effects of
Injury Severity on Jury Negligence Decisions, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAVIOR 675, 687 (1999) (re-
porting range of agreement by experimental juries in hypothetical personal cases of between
fifty-six and ninety-four percent); Harry Kalven, Jr., The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L RV.
1055, 1065 (1964) (reporting agreement between trial judge and jury on proper outcome in sev-
enty-nine percent of actually-litigated personal injury cases).
38. This is the kind of virtue that Lon Fuller once identified as part of the "inner morality'
of the law. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 42 (rev. ed. 1969); Gergen, supra note 9,
438.
39. The fact that such a process would be considered more objectionable if it were not cam-
ouflaged within the negligence system is confirmed by the controversy that erupted two decades
ago over lack of uniformity in the decisions of disability claims by Administrative Law Judges.
See JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS 21 (1978) (presenting
data demonstrating that the likelihood of a determination that the claimant was disabled was
largely a function of which judge heard a claimant's appeal).
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serve on the jury also is a mere contingency because the decision
would not necessarily be the same if the same case were tried to a
different jury. Such contingency lacks the legitimacy that uniform-
ity of decision would provide.
Nor do most of the general arguments in favor of the use of
juries justify the exercise of normative discretion by the finder of
fact in unbounded cases. For example, using juries as counter-
weights to excessive rigidity in the law hardly is necessary when
the fact-finder's discretion is unbounded by law.40 And the greater
drama that the jury trial brings to the administration of justice ex-
ists whether or not jury discretion is unbounded.41
The best argument in favor of tolerating the contingency en-
tailed in unbounded negligence decisions has some strength, but
not enough. If courts decided negligence cases, the argument goes,
then their decisions would crystallize into rules of law through the
operation of stare decisis. Social facts change quickly, however, and
juries that are not bound by precedent can react instantaneously to
social change, including changes in what constitutes reasonable
care under particular circumstances. If courts made negligence de-
cisions, they would be much slower to react to social change because
of the binding effect of precedent and the difficulty of overruling
it.42
This capacity of juries to reflect social change in their judg-
ments, however, is purchased at the high cost of potential variabil-
ity of result.43 In any given case, or in two different cases taking
place without intervening social change, outcomes may vary de-
pending entirely on the norm that the particular jury deciding the
case considers appropriate. The ideal, therefore, is not judicial deci-
sion of negligence cases, but decision by finders of fact capable of
taking changing social conditions instantaneously into account, yet
constrained by independent norms in such a way that their deci-
sions produce greater regularity of result.
40. Bohlen, supra note 6, at 116-17.
41. GREEN, supra note 9, at 395.
42. Bohlen, supra note 6, at 116-17.
43. But see JOHN G. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 282 (6th ed. 1983) (arguing that lack of
uniformity is not too high a price to pay, because after-the-fact adjustment of losses rather than
the deterrence of misconduct is the main concern of negligence liability).
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b. Bounded Cases
The deficiencies in the legitimacy of decision in unbounded
negligence cases are worth comparing with negligence cases influ-
enced or governed by independent, pre-existing norms. The legiti-
macy of decision in this second type of case is greater in some re-
spects, but not in others.
In cases governed by the rule that violation of a safety stat-
ute is negligence per se, the source of the applicable norm is a leg-
islature. The standard of care is not created contingently by each
finder of fact. Rather, the source of the standard is a politically ac-
countable branch of government, whose dictates the law of torts has
determined it is unreasonable to violate. Because the governing
norm in such cases is independent of jury discretion, that norm will
govern every case involving the same relevant facts. Cases gov-
erned by statute are therefore much more likely to be decided alike
than unbounded cases to which a statute does not apply. That is, of
course, the whole point of statutes and of the negligence per se doc-
trine.
On the other hand, in cases involving custom or professional
standards, making the legitimacy assessment is more difficult.
Here the sources of standards are not politically accountable. These
sources, however, are to an uncertain but often significant extent
economically accountable. When those conducting an activity
threaten persons with whom they are directly or indirectly in con-
tract, then the parties themselves have an incentive to set stan-
dards of care at an optimal level. The legitimacy of standards set by
this "market" for safety derives from the explicit or implicit consent
of potential victims to the standards themselves. When I buy a
Yugo, I expect and have implicitly consented to receiving less pro-
tection in a collision than when I buy a Mercedes.
Nevertheless, this form of legitimacy is undermined in two
ways. First, of course, various flaws in the market for safety may
render the standards it generates sub-optimal. Potential victims
may not have sufficient information about the risks and benefits
associated with a particular product or service to make optimal de-
cisions; potential injurers may be able to externalize some of the
cost of injuries and therefore may behave sub-optimally. Second,
some potential victims are not even indirectly in contract with po-
tential injurers, but are instead unrelated third parties. The mar-
ket will not cause the interests of these third parties to be reflected
in the standards of care followed by potential injurers. Thus, when
the market for safety is not functioning effectively or when the vic-
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tim is an unrelated third party, the argument for legitimacy based
on consent is weak. Interestingly, unrelated third parties are much
more likely to be victims in cases where custom plays a role than in
malpractice cases involving the application of professional stan-
dards. For this reason, there is some logic in the rules that make
compliance with or violation of custom evidentiary only, but com-
pliance with professional standards dispositive. 44 The arguably
greater market legitimacy of the latter may help to explain the dif-
ference.
On the variability-of-result dimension, cases involving cus-
tom and professional standards fare better than unbounded negli-
gence cases, but not as well as cases involving statutes. Because
evidence of compliance with or violation of custom is admissible but
not dispositive, customary norms will not automatically yield uni-
formity of result, although they will incline decisions in this direc-
tion. In contrast, professional standards are binding on finders of
fact, and the respectable minority rule binds even where there is
more than one potentially applicable standard. In theory, therefore,
like cases involving professional liability should be decided alike as
frequently as cases involving statutes. But the rule that violation
of a statute is negligence per se is easily explained in an instruction
to the jury and easily understood. The respectable minority rule is
not only more complicated, but may also be counterintuitive to
many finders of fact. As a practical matter, therefore, I suspect that
professional standards do not as often exercise the same binding
effect on finders of fact as statutes. Consequently, the rules re-
garding professional standards probably result in consistent deci-
sions no more frequently than the rules regarding the role of cus-
tom.
To summarize, civil juries that create norms in unbounded
negligence cases have greater formal legitimacy as sources of norms
than industry customs and professional standards, but no greater,
and arguably less, legitimacy than statutes. In contrast, custom
and professional standards have a measure of market accountabil-
ity that civil juries lack. In these respects, the legitimacy compari-
son between bounded and unbounded cases is inconclusive. Neither
approach is clearly superior to the other.
44. See Richard A. Epstein, The Path to T.J. Hooper: The Theory and History of Custom in
the Law of Tort, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4-5 (1992) (arguing on this basis that custom should bo
dispositive in cases involving consensual relations and irrelevant in stranger cases).
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The difference that stands out in the comparison, however,
involves the regularity of results that can be expected in the two
kinds of cases. Those in which independent, pre-existing norms fig-
ure or govern are clearly superior in this respect. Outcomes are
likely to be more predictable, unique cases are more likely to be de-
cided the same way regardless of the values of the particular finder
of fact making the decision, and recurring cases are more likely to
be treated alike. These deficiencies in the negligence standard are
worth recognizing as we contemplate the future of negligence, espe-
cially in connection with areas of liability to which the negligence
standard traditionally has not been applied. Almost exclusively
these involve liability for non-physical damage or loss.
II. BEYOND PHYSICAL DAMAGE
The core of negligence law involves liability for physical
damage: bodily injury and property damage, plus the intangible
economic and emotional losses that are the consequence of these
two forms of tangible damage. Setting aside several exceptional
categories of loss that I shall discuss below, the courts have tradi-
tionally been reluctant to extend liability for negligence beyond
physical damage and its proximate consequences.
A conventional, and probably tenable, rationale for this limi-
tation on liability is that there would be no realistic limit on the
amount of liability that injurers would face if there were liability
for negligently-caused pure economic or emotional loss. 45 I want to
argue, however, that there is an additional reason for the tendency
of negligence law to limit itself to liability for physical damage. The
inevitable norm-creation that I have identified as characteristic of
unbounded negligence cases would be even more objectionable if it
routinely occurred in cases involving intangible loss.
I should emphasize that I am not opposed in principle to the
expansion of liability for intangible loss, but only to the expansion
of liability based on negligence. Where liability for negligence is
ruled out, there are still two alternatives. The first involves less
45. See generally Fleming James, Jr., Limitations on Liability for Economic Loss Caused by
Negligence! A Pragmatic Appraisal, 25 VAND. L REV. 43 (1972) (examining the bases of limita-
tion on liability for economic loss). The classic statement is Cardozo's, in a case seeking recovery
for negligent misrepresentation by a plaintiff who was not in privity with the accountant who
made the misrepresentation: "If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the
failure to detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries, may expose accountants
to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class."
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931).
2001] 1209
VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW
liability than there would be if recovery for negligence were permit-
ted: liability only where the injurer intended harm. But the second
alternative involves more liability even than in negligence: strict
liability or its first-party counterpart, no-fault. My argument is
simply that, because of all the special flaws that inhere in a negli-
gence standard, especially as applied to liability for intangible loss,
the choice must be made between these other two forms of liabil-
ity-between very narrow and very broad liability.
This was, in fact, the traditional approach of the common
law of torts in connection with claims for intangible loss. In some
settings, the common law limitations of liability to cases in which
the defendant intended harm may have seemed unduly protective of
injurers. At other times, the common law's imposition of strict li-
ability seemed unduly harsh. The burden of my argument-ex-
tending Henderson's argument of twenty-five years ago-is that
there was nevertheless a measure of wisdom in these approaches
that we post-formalists have not sufficiently recognized.46 The ap-
parently easy and attractive compromise that negligence liability
affords is in fact neither easy nor attractive.
A. Principles of Demarcation
Consider the kinds of losses that are made compensable by
tort causes of action that do not sound in negligence. Typically,
those having as a requisite element the defendant's intent to cause
actual physical harm-battery, trespass, nuisance-have corre-
sponding causes of action sounding in negligence. On the other
hand, when there is a cause of action for intentionally causing in-
tangible loss, usually there is no liability for negligently causing the
same kind of loss. And only rarely is there strict liability for intan-
gible loss. Thus, most of the torts that impose liability for intangi-
ble loss, including false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, fraud,
invasion of privacy, and interference with contractual or prospec-
tive advantage, have no negligence equivalents.
It is striking that liability for intangible loss alone is so
rarely based on negligence. Because the reasons these different
causes of action cannot be based on negligence vary enormously, it
is admittedly dangerous to generalize about the entire body of non-
negligence-based tort law. But a common factor among them is that
there are no independent, pre-existing standards of reasonableness
46. See Henderson, supra note 3, at 478-83.
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applicable to the activities they address. Permitting the imposition
of liability for negligence would therefore place the finder of fact in
a trackless sea with nothing to do but create a norm to fit the situa-
tion. At least partly for this reason, the law of torts has sensibly
refrained from doing so. When such norms do exist, however, im-
posing liability in negligence for intangible loss is more feasible.
The existence of such norms is therefore a necessary, though not a
sufficient condition of liability.
There are two reasons why there are often no independent,
pre-existing norms regarding what constitutes unreasonable be-
havior in connection with the activities addressed by the torts
which redress intangible loss. First, as to some of these activities,
all that is normatively expected by those who engage in and are af-
fected by them is that these parties refrain from intentionally
causing harm. For example, commercial norms may require that
one party not deliberately interfere with the performance of a con-
tract between two other parties. But those in the business world do
not expect that other parties exercise reasonable care to avoid unin-
tentionally interfering with contract performance. Similarly, inten-
tionally invading the private space of another person is generally
regarded as egregiously improper. But as embarrassing as uninten-
tional invasions may be, we do not expect others to exercise reason-
able care to avoid overhearing or seeing other people's intimate
conversations or interactions. The moral wrong of invading an-
other's privacy is its deliberate character, not the fact of invasion
alone, even when carelessly committed.
Second, even when it might be argued that there is a societal
expectation that reasonable care be exercised to avoid causing cer-
tain kinds of intangible loss, there is nothing like a consensus re-
garding what constitutes reasonable care in these settings. For ex-
ample, in my view, there would be broad disagreement about how
much care should be exercised to avoid unintentionally locking
someone in a department store overnight, or to ensure that the in-
formation given to the buyer of a used car by a private seller was
accurate. Permitting the imposition of liability for the intangible
losses caused by the failure to exercise reasonable care in these set-
tings would result in enormous variability of result in different
cases. Consequently, liability for negligence is not imposed. Rather,
in effect, we rely on potential victims to exercise the self-protective
care necessary to avoid harm that would result from unintentional
injury-causing activity. Shoppers are expected to know when de-
partment stores close. Buyers of used cars are expected not to rely
on the good faith representations of private sellers.
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On the other hand, we go further and impose strict liability,
instead of negligence liability, in the rarer settings when we expect
more from potential injurers than merely refraining from inten-
tionally causing intangible harm. This was, in essence, the ap-
proach taken by the common law of defamation. It is also the ap-
proach taken when there is liability for innocent misrepresentation,
which in effect amounts to liability for breach of warranty.
In short, the middle ground between liability only for intent
to cause intangible harm and strict liability for such harm is largely
unoccupied with the exception of liability in negligence for a few
relatively limited forms of intangible loss. Certain usually unrecog-
nized characteristics of these exceptions, however, tell us at least as
much about the reason the middle ground is largely unoccupied as
more conventional explanations for these exceptions.
B. Exceptions
The list of exceptions to the general principle that there is no
liability in negligence for intangible loss is reasonably short, but
revealing. These exceptions are for the most part consistent with
my argument, though certain features of defamation liability are
not. These features of defamation, however, exhibit the very dan-
gers that my argument has identified.
1. Pure Emotional Distress
The development of liability in negligence for pure emotional
distress is the story of the progressive relaxation of restrictions on
recovery. From the impact rule, to the zone-of-danger requirement,
and eventually in some jurisdictions to the Dillon approach permit-
ting recovery based on the proximity, visibility, and relationship of
the plaintiff to an individual whose physical safety the defendant
has negligently risked,47 each rule has replaced narrower restric-
tions with new but nonetheless still restrictive rights of recovery.
However, the key to this form of liability-whatever its pre-
cise scope-is that the conception of negligence it employs is based
entirely on the standard that would be applied in an action by the
party whose physical safety was threatened by the defendant's ac-
tions. To take the classic example, the mother who witnesses her
47. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 913 (Cal. 1968).
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child suffer serious injury at the hands of the defendant must prove
that the defendant was negligent toward the child before the
mother may recover for her own emotional distress. The mother's
claim is derivative of-or at least defined by-the child's cause of
action. The court in Dillon was absolutely clear on this point:
In the absence of the primary liability of the tortfeasor for the death of the child,
we see no ground for an independent and secondary liability for claims for injuries
by third parties. The basis for such claims must be adjudicated liability and fault
of defendant; that liability and fault must be the foundation for the tort-feasor's
duty of due care to third parties who, as a consequence of such negligence, sustain
emotional trauma.48
In short, once the finder of fact determines that the defendant's
conduct was negligent in risking (or as Dillon seems to say, risking
and then actually causing) physical harm to the child, the negli-
gence decision has been made. If the defendant's conduct unrea-
sonably risked physical harm to the child, evaluation of the defen-
dant's conduct is at an end. That evaluation governs the mother's
action as well. The finder of fact does not begin again and ask
whether the defendant drove carefully enough with respect to the
mother, employing different considerations because the risk to the
mother involved emotional loss alone. Rather, negligent driving is
negligent driving.
The point I want to make about this arrangement should be
obvious. In making its negligence decision, the finder of fact in emo-
tional distress cases such as Dillon does not do anything more than
or different from what it would do in a case brought by the party
whose physical safety the defendant risked or caused. If the defen-
dant did not negligently risk causing physical harm, there is no li-
ability for emotional distress. Otherwise the finder of fact would
have to create a standard of care that does not exist, at least not in
a form that can be "found" as an answer to a question of fact. To put
it another way, there is no standard governing the care that must
be exercised to avoid risking emotional distress alone.
For this reason, except in rare circumstances, 49 there is no
cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress when
the conduct causing such distress does not simultaneously and neg-
ligently risk causing physical injury. Negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress is not simply a less blameworthy version of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. It is a different animal en-
48. Id. at 916.
49. The principal examples are negligently incorrect reports of the death of a close relative
and negligent mishandling of dead bodies. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 25, at 362.
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tirely, wholly derivative of liability for negligently causing physical
harm.
As I indicated earlier, I am far from satisfied that applica-
tion of the negligence standard in cases involving physical harm is
as defensible as the conventional view suggests. But understood the
way I have contended it should be understood, at least we may say
in favor of liability for negligent infliction of emotional distress that
it is no less defensible on this score than liability for negligent in-
fliction of physical harm. The extension of negligence liability for
this form of harm involves no new form of negligence, no new work
for finders of fact, no development of any standard of conduct that
did not already exist. In fact, this form of liability is simply an ex-
ample of liability imposed on precisely the same basis as liability
for negligent infliction of physical harm.
2. Economic Loss
The traditional rule was that there is no liability in negli-
gence for pure economic loss, apart from liability for negligent mis-
representation (which I address below).50 In recent years, some in-
roads have been made on that limitation. 51 Although both the cir-
cumstances under which the courts have permitted such liability
and the justifications for doing so vary, all the cases permitting re-
covery, with very few exceptions, share one characteristic. In each
case the determination that the defendant was (or could be found)
negligent is derivative rather than primary. That is, the defen-
dant's negligence is determined by reference to the reasonableness
of risking some other kind of harm-usually physical harm-either
to the plaintiff or to a third party. As in liability for negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress, this new form of liability employs a neg-
ligence standard that is identical to and derivative of the standard
employed by an established cause of action that applies, or could
apply, to the same facts.
50. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 308-09 (1927).
51. For deft, though competing, analyses of this disparate class of cases, see Gary T.
Schwartz, The Economic Loss Doctrine in American Tort Law: Assessing the Recent Experience,
in CIVIL LIABILITY FOR PURE ECONOMIc LOss 103 (Efstathios K. Banakas ed., 1996) (emphasizing
the importance of contract principles in explaining seemingly divergent results); Robert L. Rabin,
Tort Recovery for Negligently Inflicted Economic Loss: A Reassessment, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1513,
1514-15 (1985) (arguing that ensuring proportionality between the defendant's wrong and the
scope of liability imposed helps explain seemingly contradictory application of rules limiting
liability for pure economic loss).
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Consider three leading cases permitting recovery in negli-
gence for pure economic loss. First, in Union Oil Co. v. Oppen,52
commercial fishermen were permitted recovery for profits lost as
result of a negligently caused oil spill. The defendant stipulated
that it was negligent. But it is clear from the court's opinion that,
had the issue been contested, the conduct of the defendant in risk-
ing physical damage to natural resources would have been the focus
of the negligence decision. Throughout its opinion, the court's men-
tion of a defendant's negligence is repeatedly followed by a refer-
ence to negligently caused physical harm that also risks other eco-
nomic loss.
Similarly, in People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consolidated
Rail Corp.,53 it was alleged that the defendant had negligently al-
lowed a dangerous chemical to escape from a railway tank car. In-
dividuals and businesses in the surrounding area were forced to
evacuate because of the threat to their health and safety. Plaintiff
was a commercial airline that suffered economic loss as a result of
the interruption of its business. Though the court could have been
clearer on the point, the opening sentence of the opinion denying
defendant's motion for summary judgment reveals that the negli-
gence of the defendant in risking physical harm to persons and
property was the logical predicate for the decision. The question,
said the court, was "whether a defendant's negligent conduct that
interferes with a plaintiffs business resulting in purely economic
losses . . . is compensable in tort."54 Thus, the question was not
whether the defendant was negligent in risking economic harm to
the plaintiff, but whether a defendant who was in fact negligent in
risking physical harm to others could be held liable to a plaintiff
who suffered economic loss alone. The threshold negligence ques-
tion apparently had either already been answered or assumed
away.
Finally, in J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory,55 the plaintiff lessee suf-
fered economic loss resulting from a general contractor's delay in
completing a project on the leased premises under a contract with
the owner/lessor. The court reversed the trial court's dismissal of
the complaint, holding that the defendant could be held liable to the
plaintiff for negligently failing to complete the project with due
diligence. Significantly, however, the plaintiff had alleged as a basis
52. Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974).
53. People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consolid. Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107 (N.J. 1985).
54. Id. at 108.
55. J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60 (Cal. 1979).
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for recovery that the delay in completing the project constituted a
breach of the defendant's contract with the owner, which required
completion within a reasonable time.
In contrast to Oppen and People Express, in J'Aire the defen-
dant had not negligently risked physical harm to others. But just
as in those cases, there was a pre-existing, independent standard
for determining whether the defendant had behaved negligently-
the terms of the construction contract with the third party
owner/lessor. As in Oppen and People Express, therefore, the finder
of fact did not have to venture into unmapped territory and create a
norm of conduct in order to determine whether the defendant was
negligent. Rather, the negligence decision was derivative of an al-
ready-established and legally binding norm.
3. Misrepresentation
The rule that there is no liability for economic loss resulting
from negligent misrepresentation is subject to an exception for
cases in which a "special relationship" exists between the parties, or
where the defendant is in such a relationship and its negligence
risks harm to an actually foreseen and limited number of third par-
ties. Virtually all of the cases in both categories involve profession-
als whose work-product contains the misrepresentation at issue:
lawyers, accountants, public weighers, and title abstracters, for ex-
ample. 6 In effect, these are malpractice cases.
Because of pre-existing professional standards in such cases,
there is no need for the finder of fact to develop a norm for use in
making the negligence decision. That norm-the professional stan-
dard governing the conduct in question-already exists independ-
ently. Consequently, these cases follow the same pattern as those
involving negligent infliction of pure emotional distress and pure
economic loss. The negligence decision is completely derivative of,
or in fact identical to, a pre-existing standard. The threshold negli-
gence question either has already been answered, or can be an-
swered on a wholly conventional basis, without the need to enter
normatively uncharted new ground.
56. See, e.g., Williams v. Polgar, 215 N.W.2d 149 (Mich. 1974) (involving a title abstracter);
Petrillo v. Bachenberg, 655 A.2d 1354 (N.J. 1995) (involving a lawyer); Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931) (involving an accountant); Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275
(N.Y. 1922) (involving a public weigher).
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4. Constitutional Torts
Damages actions for civil rights violations sometimes involve
tangible physical damage, but they may also involve intangible in-
jury. In §1983 actions against state officials for damages resulting
from deprivation of constitutional rights57 (and against federal offi-
cials under the Bivens58 line of cases), defendants have available
the defense of qualified immunity.5 9 Under this defense, govern-
ment officials performing discretionary functions lose this immu-
nity from liability for civil damages if their conduct violates clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights; a right is clearly es-
tablished if the contours of the right are sufficiently clear that a
reasonable official would understand that his conduct violates the
right.6 0 Combining the cause of action and the defense, the stan-
dard of liability that results is this: the official is liable for depriv-
ing the plaintiff of rights of which it was objectively unreasonable
to be unaware.
61
Some rights are so clearly established that it is negligent per
se to be unaware of them. As to these rights, the standard of liabil-
ity is entirely bounded because the test for liability is pre-existing
and independent: what is clearly established by law. There may be
a bit of play in the joints, however, with respect to particular appli-
cations of rights that are clearly but only generally established. As
to these particular applications, in practice the standard may vary
somewhat across categories of officials because different officials
have different degrees of education, sophistication, and training in
constitutional law.6
2
For two reasons, administration of the qualified immunity
standard in this sub-category of cases is probably less bounded
57. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
58. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971) (permitting actions for damages against federal officials under the Fourth Amendment).
59. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
60. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638-
39 (1987).
61. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 588 (1998).
62. "As recurring situations have been encountered, there has developed what amounts to a
law of qualified immunity for police officers, a law of qualified immunity for school board offi-
cials, a law of qualified immunity for prison guards, and so forth." JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR. ET AL.
CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS: ENFORCING THE CONSTITUTION 86 (2000); John C. Jeffries, Jr., The
Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE LJ. 87, 94 (1999) (citing 2 SHELDON H.
NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW OF SECTION 1983 §§ 8.09-8.21
(3d ed. 1991)). This variation may occur at least in part through determination of what is or is
not a clearly established right under the particular circumstances of the case at hand.
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than in cases where it is, in effect, negligent as a matter of law not
to know of a clearly established right. First, although the test for
qualified immunity is what an official should know rather than
what a particular category of officials actually knows, the latter is
arguably a factor to be taken into account in determining the for-
mer. Yet, it seems unlikely that there are well-developed concrete
norms among different categories of officials as to the degree of
knowledge one should have regarding the scope of constitutional
rights possessed by those whose rights might be affected by these
officials' actions. Only among law enforcement officers, such as po-
lice, does the existence of such a norm seem likely, and even here,
its content is likely to vary from police department to police de-
partment. Consequently, legal decision-makers must create a norm
without reference to what amounts to a "custom" within the "indus-
try" of school boards or police officers regarding their knowledge of
the law. Second, different decision-makers may therefore arrive at
different conceptions of what different categories of officials should
know about constitutional rights. For both reasons, there is a risk
that employing what amounts to a negligence standard in this sub-
category of cases will result in unbounded norm creation.
Several factors, however, serve to mitigate-and perhaps en-
tirely to eliminate-this risk. Because the subject matter of the
negligence determination involves awareness of constitutional law,
the court is likely to be at least personally acquainted with and may
well also have experience in the subject matter of the dispute. The
impact of the norm-creation phenomenon also is softened in these
cases by the fact that the qualified immunity determination is a
question for the court. In contrast to unbounded tort cases, there-
fore, the trial courts' negligence determinations at both the sum-
mary judgment and trial stages are subject to appellate review and,
presumably, the rules of stare decisis. The possibility of variation
across similar or identical cases is probably thereby reduced. Fi-
nally, the fact that the party whose conduct is being assessed is a
government official may enhance the legitimacy of the process, even
though it may involve norm-creation rather than norm identifica-
tion. That is, the adjudication of constitutional tort cases does not
involve the judiciary's micro-management of private behavior;
rather, it involves one branch of government policing the behavior
of another branch, albeit sometimes across the federal-state divide.
In short, in the limited sub-category of qualified immunity
cases in which the plaintiffs right was clearly but only generally
established, this doctrine may pose a few of the problems entailed
in using an unbounded negligence standard in common law cases.
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But for the most part, constitutional tort cases avoid these prob-
lems by employing independent norms and by rendering the quali-
fied immunity decision a question for the court that is subject to
appellate review.
5. Defamation
The common law of defamation is a morass of sometimes
technical rules, many of whose contours are not germane to my
analysis. In oversimplified terms, there is often strict liability for
intangible injury caused by a defamatory statement unless the de-
fendant was privileged to make the statement. Privilege attaches in
a variety of situations, but in most cases, it is qualified rather than
absolute. In some states, a qualified privilege is defeated by a
showing that the defendant actually knew the defamatory state-
ment was false, or made the statement with reckless disregard of
whether the statement was true or false. In many states, however,
a qualified privilege can be overcome by a showing that the defen-
dant was negligent in making the statement.3
In a series of decisions, the United States Supreme Court
has held that the First Amendment places certain limits on the
scope of liability for defamation. In cases involving public officials
and public figures who sue for defamation, there is something like a
constitutional privilege to defame: the defendant may be held liable
only if the defamatory statement was made with what the Court
termed "actual malice" (knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of its truth or falsity).64 In cases involving private figures
but public issues (which are virtually always against media defen-
dants), however, the states are free to impose liability under a
lesser standard, as long as the defendant is required to have been
at least negligent in making the defamatory statement.0
Thus, in purely private cases, and in cases involving private
plaintiffs but public issues, the states are free to and often do im-
pose liability if the defendant was negligent in making a defama-
tory statement. A very few states require greater blame-actual
63. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 252-54 (1997).
64. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964).
65. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347-49 (1974); see also Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.
v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (strongly implying that the Gertz requirements
are inapplicable to claims not involving matters of public concern).
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knowledge or reckless disregard-but most do not.66 By this point, it
will come as no surprise that I find the use of a negligence standard
in such cases objectionable. It is useful in analyzing my objection to
divide up the universe of possible defendants into two categories:
purely private parties and "media" defendants. This is of course a
simplification, but even that is part of my point.
Take first the purely private individual who is sued for
defamation under circumstances where there is a qualified privilege
to make the statement. If an actual malice standard applies, the
question for the finder of fact is what the defendant knew. This may
be a difficult inquiry, but it is a pure question of fact. In contrast, if
the negligence standard applies, the question is what the defendant
should have known. In this context, that standard translates into
the question of whether the defendant exercised reasonable care to
ascertain whether the statement was true or false.
But answering that question almost always requires norm
creation. There certainly is no general social consensus regarding
the amount of care that it is reasonable to exercise before making
statements that reflect negatively on other individuals. Moreover,
the settings in which purely private defamation is subject to a
qualified privilege vary enormously, from the writing of letters of
recommendation to the giving of advice about marriage and career
choices. Since they must create norms as they go along, finders of
fact, who are asked to determine whether defendants have been
negligent in these settings, are highly likely to arrive at varying
conclusions regarding the degree of care to be expected.
Changing focus from private individuals and businesses to
"media" defendants alters the setting and the problem, but the pre-
dicament remains the same. Now the problem is not the absence of
a norm, but the presence of too many norms. How much care the
tabloids that are sold at supermarket checkout counters should ex-
ercise to ascertain the truth of what they assert undoubtedly varies
enormously from the care the New York Times should exercise. As
in the case of constitutional torts, the care that is exercised cannot
define the care that should be exercised, but neither are these lev-
els of care irrelevant to that determination. Unless the law of defa-
mation requires precisely the same amount of care from all media
defendants, notwithstanding their great variety, norm creation by
the finder of fact is likely to be inevitable.
66. See RIcHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES & MATERIALS ON TORTS 1148 (7th ed. 2000); RODNEY
SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION §§ 3.10-3.11 (2d. ed. 2000).
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The alternative is to hold defendants strictly liable for fail-
ure to follow their own pre-expressed standards, whatever they may
be. Unlike ordinary individuals, the organized media do have codi-
fied codes of conduct, as do some individual media enterprises. The
problem with this approach, however, is that it identifies a suffi-
cient, but not a necessary basis of liability. Making violation of vol-
untary codes of conduct the touchstone of liability will tend to en-
courage relaxation of these codes, since relaxation will tend to
shrink the scope of liability. Consequently, while violation of appli-
cable codes of conduct may be negligence, compliance with them
should not automatically avoid liability.
There was a core of good sense in the traditional common
law approach, which sometimes imposed strict liability (when no
qualified privilege applied) and otherwise imposed liability only
when a species of intent (knowledge or reckless disregard) was
proved. In cases where the defendant may have been merely negli-
gent but held a qualified privilege, it was sensible for the law to
bite the bullet, so to speak, and refrain from engaging in the negli-
gence inquiry.
III. THE FUTURE OF NEGLIGENCE
My examination of the negligence standard in cases involv-
ing physical injury or damage has been designed mainly to uncover
weaknesses at the foundation of this standard. In the absence of a
systematically superior alternative, I cannot argue for abolition of
liability for negligence, despite the weaknesses of this standard.
But my analysis does have certain programmatic implications.
First, understanding the nature of what occurs in the ordinary
negligence case should encourage strengthening and further devel-
opment of doctrines that employ independent, pre-existing norms in
cases involving the negligent infliction of physical harm. Rules gov-
erning custom, statute, and professional standards are models for
this approach. Greater reliance on these and similar per se rules,
when they are feasible, would result in more directed verdicts,
thereby promoting the decision of like cases alike and enhancing
the legitimacy of decisions in negligence cases.
Second, the inequity that results from the inconsistent deci-
sion of recurring cases can be ameliorated through greater use of
various forms of aggregative valuation of the claims in such cases.6
67. See, e.g., Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, The Individual Justice of Averaging, at
http://wwv.law.harvard.edu/programsfolin center (June 2000) (Discussion Paper No. 285, John
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Aggregative. valuation or averaging can help to remove the lottery
aspect of decisions in unbounded cases. Third, the flaws in the neg-
ligence standard should make us much more willing to consider
proposals for no-fault alternatives to liability for negligence. Some
such proposals, most notably medical no-fault, are in fact forms of
strict liability. Others, such as auto no-fault, are forms of first-
party, or no liability. But no liability on the part of the injurer is
itself a form of strict liability by the victim. Thus, we can under-
stand no-fault of both sorts as a strict liability alternative to negli-
gence liability. Because so high a proportion of negligence cases in-
volve motor vehicle accidents, auto no-fault, in virtually any of its
versions, could go a long way toward avoiding the trouble with neg-
ligence.
My analysis also has strong implications for cases involving
intangible loss. One of the great advantages of the general limita-
tion of negligence liability to cases involving physical injury and its
consequences is that this limitation avoids potentially unlimited
legal intrusion into ordinary affairs. We have become accustomed to
saying that, subject to certain limited exceptions, everyone owes a
duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid foreseeable injury to eve-
ryone else in the world. But in fact that duty extends only to fore-
seeable physical injury. We owe no such general duty to avoid
causing intangible loss.
If there were such a duty, every aspect of the way we conduct
our lives could become the subject of assessment by the finder of
fact in actions alleging negligent infliction of intangible loss. A re-
gime permeated by this kind of after-the-fact micromanagement of
behavior through law is the antithesis of a polity that values a pri-
vate sphere into which government does not intrude. The law of
torts has sensibly refrained, on the whole, from encouraging this
kind of intrusion.
We should therefore be far less sanguine than is sometimes
supposed about use of a negligence standard in cases involving in-
tangible loss. The force of this suggestion, of course, is that we must
instead make the choice between imposing liability only if the in-
jurer intended to cause harm, and imposing strict liability. The
great appeal of moving to a negligence standard is that it appears
to be superior to both these alternatives. It does not relieve negli-
M. Olin Center, Harvard Law School) (discussing whether civil cases should be resolved based on
individual justice or compulsory averaging across cases); Kenneth S. Abraham & Glen 0. Robin-
son, Aggregative Valuation of Mass Tort Claims, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1990, at 137
(analyzing approaches to the aggregative valuation of individual tort claims).
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gent wrongdoers of liability, but neither does it impose liability in
the absence of wrongdoing.
In light of my analysis, however, it is worth recognizing that
often the superiority of this compromise will be more apparent than
real. It simply will not do to assume that we can identify those who
cnegligently" inflict intangible harm, and then to conclude that im-
posing liability on such wrongdoers is desirable. My point is that
this assumption will too often be unwarranted because the identifi-
cation of negligent behavior is problematic. In the absence of inde-
pendent, pre-existing norms of behavior, the very idea of negligence
is shaky; the finder of fact will in effect create a conception of negli-
gent behavior to fit the case at hand. And even if this conception of
negligence were acceptable, there would be no reason to suppose
that a subsequent finder of fact would create the same standard to
fit a case posing the same facts. Consequently, the notion that by
moving to a negligence standard we would be imposing liability on
more wrongdoers, while simultaneously avoiding imposing liability
without fault, is far more heroic than is justified. For this reason,
the traditional common law barriers to recovery in negligence for
intangible harm should be maintained.
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